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Abstract 
This paper aims to evaluate the impact of financial sector reforms on the cost structure 
characteristics and on the ownership-cost efficiency relationship in Indian banking. It also 
examines the impact of reforms on the dynamics of competition in the lending market. We 
find evidence that deregulation starts a process of improvement in banks performance and 
fosters competition in the lending market. Results suggest technological progress, once 
Indian commercial banks have adjusted to the new regulatory environment by changing both 
the input mix and the output composition. This, however, does not translate in efficiency 
gains. There is also evidence of an ownership effect on the level and pattern of efficiency 
change. Finally, competition keeps building pace even in the re-regulation period and 
technological improvements are not hampered by the tightening of prudential norms. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial deregulation and concomitant prudential re-regulation have recently been a 
dominant feature in financial markets of both developed and developing countries. On the 
one hand, deregulation aims to lower firms’ regulatory costs and foster competition in the 
banking and financial sectors. The standard economic argument for the positive influence of 
competition on firms’ performance is that the existence of monopoly rents gives managers 
the potential of capturing some of them in the form of slack or inefficiency (see Nickell et 
al., 1997). Therefore, deregulation-induced competition should in turn translate into 
incentives for managers to improve efficiency and performance. On the other hand, the aim 
of prudential re-regulation is to foster stability and minimise excessive risk taking. As a 
consequence, it imposes higher costs and could hamper competition, therefore resulting in a 
decrease in firms’ efficiency and performance. Despite the fact that a deregulation-prudential 
re-regulation framework has widely been adopted by policy makers, relatively little 
empirical work has been done to evaluate the overall impact of such processes on banks’ 
competition and efficiency. In addition, the relevance of corporate governance also remains 
controversial and different ownerships are found to react with different speeds to the change 
of regulatory environment (Isik and Hassan, 2003).  This paper aims to fill these gaps in the 
literature, with particular reference to the reform of the Indian commercial banking sector 
during the period 1992-2004. The Indian reform process can be divided into two stages: a 
first stage of deregulation aimed at promoting competition (1992-1997) and a second stage 
(post 1998) aimed at strengthening financial stability (see Narasimham, 1998). In detail, this 
study examines the effect of the concomitant deregulation and prudential re-regulation 
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framework adopted by the Indian authorities on the competitive behaviour, cost structure 
characteristics and efficiency of Indian commercial banks. As the overall impact of financial 
reforms on bank efficiency may be determined by the structure of the financial system prior 
to deregulation, we also specifically investigate the ownership-cost efficiency relationship. 
Following Battese and Coelli (1995), we employ a stochastic cost frontier approach to 
estimate the efficient cost structure and the determinants of cost inefficiency on a balanced 
panel dataset that includes public sector, domestic private and foreign banks continuously 
operating in India throughout the sample period. In a second step, we examine the overall 
impact of regulatory reform on the dynamics of competition in the lending market. Using the 
marginal cost of loans derived from the stochastic cost frontier, we calculate the overcharge 
on loans (defined as the price-marginal cost ratio). We then estimate the persistence of the 
overcharge through a partial adjustment model. An increased persistence of the overcharge 
would indicate that competitive conditions have not improved over the period of analysis and 
vice versa.  
Our results indicate technological regress until 1996 and progress thereafter.  This suggests 
that it takes time for banks to adjust to the newly deregulated operating environment but it 
also evidences a general improvement of the production technology adopted by Indian banks 
following the reforms.  Efficiency gains seem to take place in the deregulation period, until 
1997. However, the overall trend in efficiency is negative during the sample period. This 
could be explained by re-regulation imposing higher costs, but also by the fact that, because 
of the technological improvements, the average bank may find it more difficult to operate 
efficiently. Our results also indicate the existence of an ownership effect on the level and 
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pattern of efficiency, with foreign banks losing their initial efficiency advantage in a more 
deregulated environment. Further, foreign banks seem initially better equipped to cope with 
re-regulation, but again their efficiency advantage is short lived. Finally, we find evidence 
that deregulation starts a process of improvement in banks performance and fosters 
competition on the market. Competition keeps building pace even in the re-regulation period 
and technological improvements are not hampered by the tightening of prudential norms.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the general background of 
the Indian banking system. Section 3 discusses the existing literature on the effects of 
financial reforms on banks performance and competition. Section 4 describes the 
methodology, the data and the variables used. The empirical results are illustrated in Section 
5 and Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. The Indian banking sector and regulatory environment 
 
The Indian government started its banking sector reform in 1992. The whole reform 
programme was led by two Narasimham Committee reports, in 1991 and 1998 respectively. 
As a consequence, the reform process can be divided into two stages. The first stage relates 
to regulatory changes aimed at promoting competition (1992-1997). The second stage, 
started in 1998, aimed at strengthening financial stability.  
Structural deregulation was characterised by the liberalisation of interest rates on deposits 
and lending; the removal of restrictions on entry and on private ownership; and the increase 
of the range of permissible activities. From 1998 onwards, the emphasis of the reform 
process focussed on the stability of the banking system. For example, prudential norms on 
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assets classification, income recognition, provisioning on non-performing loans and risk-
based capital requirements became progressively more important, particularly against the 
backdrop of the Asian crisis
1
. The whole reform process aimed to create a level playing field 
among different ownership; regulatory policies relating to interest rates, prudential norms 
and reserve requirements were applied uniformly across banking groups. However, priority 
sector credit requirements are still in place, with different targets for domestic and foreign 
banks
2
. Table 1 illustrates the changing structure of the Indian banking sector over the reform 
period, with reference to scheduled commercial banks
3
 (excluding regional rural banks). At 
the end of 2004, the 27 public sector (state-owned) banks accounted for 74.5% of the market 
share in terms of total assets, a decrease of 16% compared to 1992. Due to the reforms 
opening up the sector to private ownership, both domestic private and foreign banks 
increased in number and their relative market share also increased, although foreign banks 
still remain rather marginal, covering only 6.9% of the market in 2004. In terms of 
concentration ratios, both the five firms concentration ratio (CR5) and the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) show a decreasing trend over the sample period. The high CR5 but 
rather low HHI indicate the inequality of market shares across scheduled commercial banks.  
<Insert Table 1> 
Table 2 provides some descriptive statistics of selected banking indicators. The spread, 
                                                 
1 Among the major prudential policy initiatives post-1997 were the introduction of the CAMELS (Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management quality, Earnings, Liquidity and System evaluation) annual supervision system in 1997, the increase of 
the risk-based capital adequacy requirement to 9% (effective from March 2000), and the introduction of a 90-day 
delinquency norm for the classification of non-performing loans. 
2 The Indian government requires banks to allocate a specified portion of their lending (40% for domestic banks and 32% 
for foreign banks) to priority sectors. Priority sectors are defined by the Reserve Bank of India and include, among others, 
agriculture, small scale industries, education and housing.  
3 Scheduled commercial banks refer to those banks that have paid up capital and reserve of no less than Rs 500,000 and 
other conditions specified by the Banking Regulation Act of 1965. Scheduled commercial banks consist of public, private, 
foreign and regional rural banks.  
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measured both as the difference between the implicit credit rate and deposit rate, and as the 
gap between the implicit credit rate and the average price of loanable funds, is decreasing 
over time, which is consistent with increased competition fostered by the reform process. 
The data also reveal a growing preference for safer, more liquid other earning assets, 
especially government securities. Lending, as a ratio of total earning assets, decreases whilst 
investment increases. Moreover, the ratio of government and other approved securities to 
deposits (the statutory liquidity ratio, or SRL) remains higher than the prescribed minimum 
level over the whole sample period
4
. Finally, the data show that the ratio of fee-based income 
to total income increased from 13.4% in 1992 to 23.7% in 2004. This may suggest an 
attempt of banks to reduce the impact of the decreasing spread on profits by shifting the 
business focus from traditional on balance sheet business towards fee-based, non-traditional 
off-balance sheet business, which has become available owing to the removal of the 
restriction on activities in the deregulated operational environment.  
 
<Insert Table 2> 
3. Literature review 
According to microeconomic theory, deregulation should positively affect the efficiency and 
productivity of the banking industry as it reduces the regulatory cost imposed on market 
participants. In addition, increased competition fostered by deregulation should induce banks 
to minimise costs to maintain market shares and profitability. However, the empirical 
evidence is mixed: deregulation seems to have had a positive effect on the banking sectors in 
some countries but not in others (Berger et al., 2000a). Controversy is not only related to the 
                                                 
4 The prescribed SRL was 38.5% in 1991-1992 and was progressively reduced to 25% from 1997 onwards.  
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overall efficiency and productivity improvements, but also to the manner in which these 
improvements take place: in some countries deregulation mainly promotes efficiency, whilst 
in others it appears to stimulate technological progress (Zhao et al., 2008). Indeed, the 
outcome of deregulation policies may reflect several country-specific demand and supply 
conditions of the banking industry prior to deregulation. 
Whilst several studies investigate the link between market structure indicators (such as 
concentration ratios) and performance in the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance 
(SCP) context, such studies typically do not explicitly incorporate the effect of regulation, 
nor do they analyse whether regulatory changes strengthen or weaken this link (Gilbert, 
1984). There is no conclusive evidence on how regulatory changes in the late 1990s have 
affected the structure, conduct and performance relationship in the financial sector. The New 
Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) literature, on the other hand, departs from the SCP 
paradigm and attempts to infer the degree of competition in the market by analysing firms’ 
conduct. The empirical evidence provided by NEIO studies, however, fails to identify 
increased competition following the rapid deregulation and liberalisation processes in the EU 
area (Maudos and Fernandez De Guevara, 2004; Fernandez De Guevara et al., 2005), or in 
the UK banking system (Matthews et al., 2007). The fact that competition does not always 
increase following a period of deregulation may be explained by the fact that in most 
countries a parallel process of prudential re-regulation has taken place. Regulatory reform is 
often a mixed process of deregulation and prudential re-regulation and therefore the net 
effect on competition is not clearly identifiable.  
Both the SCP and the NEIO approaches, though, are based on static models of competitive 
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equilibrium. On the other hand, the persistence of profit (POP) hypothesis (Mueller, 1977, 
1986) posits that if entry and exit are sufficiently free, this would quickly eliminate any 
abnormal profit and all firms’ profits would tend to converge toward the same long run 
average. However, if abnormal profits tend to persist from year to year, then there might be 
barriers to entry or banks might be exploiting monopoly power. Empirical tests of the POP 
hypothesis in banking include Berger et al. (2000b), who use a non-parametric measurement 
of persistence in the US, and Goddard et al. (2004a, 2004b) who estimate a parametric 
model for the EU. Both studies presented some evidence of persistence of profit. 
Another issue of relevance relates to the impact of regulatory reform and increased 
competition on the ownership structure of banks. In theory, increased competition should 
provide incentives to managers to improve efficiency regardless of the type of ownership. In 
other words, the stronger the competitive pressure, the less relevant the ownership structure 
should become for productive efficiency (Vickers, 1995; Allen and Gale, 2000). In empirical 
studies, however, ownership structure does not appear to be neutral in terms of changes in 
efficiency and productivity following financial reforms. While deregulation seems to 
increase efficiency for all banks, it does not result in inter-ownership convergence 
(Bonaccorsi di Patti and Hardy, 2005). Different ownerships are found to react with different 
speeds to the change of regulatory environment (Isik and Hasan, 2003; Leightner and Lovell, 
1998). Domestic private banks are often found to perform better than government-owned 
banks, although some disagreement remains in the literature (Megginson, 2005). Foreign 
banks are found to perform better than domestic banks in developing countries, while in 
developed countries the opposite is true (Berger et al., 2000a; Berger et al., 2004).  
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The empirical literature analysing the impact of the substantial transformation of the Indian 
banking system on bank efficiency and competition suggests a decrease in cost efficiency 
post-1992 (Kumbhakar and Sarkar, 2005; Sensarma, 2005). Das and Ghosh (2006) attribute 
the high cost inefficiency both to the under-utilisation of resources and to the scale of 
operations. Kumbhakar and Sarkar (2003) fail to identify a significant impact of regulatory 
reform on total factor productivity growth. Zhao et al. (2008) identify sustained productivity 
growth in the post-reform period, driven mainly by technological progress. Empirical results 
also provide little evidence to suggest that public sector banks are less cost efficient than 
their domestic private and foreign counterparts (Sensarma, 2005; Zhao et al, 2008). With 
respect to the competitive conditions of the Indian banking market, Prasad and Ghosh (2005) 
estimate the H-statistic and conclude that, while the Indian banking system is characterised 
by monopolistic competition, there is evidence of increased competition in the period 2000-
2004 compared to 1996-1999.  
Our study contributes in several ways to the existing literature and the paucity of systematic 
studies on the impact of policy changes onto banks competition and performance.  Our 
empirical analysis covers the whole period of Indian reforms, which allows us to properly 
test their overall impact on banks cost performance in general and on the ownership-cost 
efficiency relationship in particular.  Since the deregulation and re-regulation policies could 
have opposite, complementary effects on market competition, which is expected to be the 
main channel through which improvements are meant to take place, we also separately test 
for the dynamics of competition by estimating a partial adjustment model, in line with the 
POP literature approach.  
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4. Methodology 
4.1 Variables and data 
To carry out our empirical analysis, we estimate two models: a cost frontier (which requires 
the identification of output and input price variables) and a partial adjustment model (which 
requires the estimation of the overcharge on loans, the price to marginal cost ratio). For our 
variables definition we broadly follow the intermediation approach (Sealey and Lindley, 
1977) and use a two-input, three-output specification. The first output is the book value of 
performing loans, measured as the difference between total loans and non-performing loans. 
This is to control for loan quality, given the existence of high levels of non-performing loans 
in the Indian banking system and the heterogeneity in the quality of loans among individual 
banks. The imputed price of loans is calculated as the ratio of interest received on loans over 
total performing loans
5
. The second output is “other earning assets”6, to capture their 
increased presence on banks’ balance sheet. Finally, we define fee-based income as the third 
output to accommodate the shift of banks’ business focus from traditional on-balance-sheet 
activities to non-traditional off-balance-sheet activities.  
Two inputs are selected to match the characteristics of the three specified outputs. The first 
input - total loanable funds - sums deposits and money market funding, and its price is 
calculated as the ratio of total interest expenditure to total loanable funds. The second input - 
non-interest operating costs - aggregates the expenditure associated with labour and physical 
capital; its price is given by the ratio between non-interest operating cost and total assets. 
                                                 
5 According to the accounting practice followed by the Indian banking sector post-1992, income accrual would cease once 
the loan is recognized as non-performing. Therefore, the interest received on loans recorded in the loss and profit account is 
associated with the performing loans. 
6 Other earning assets aggregates government securities, other approved securities, share, debentures and bonds, subsidiaries 
and joint ventures and other investment outside India (i.e. total investment).  
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The data, collected from the Reserve Bank of India, cover continuously operating Indian 
commercial banks (excluding regional rural banks) throughout the period 1992-2004, 
encompassing the whole reform experience. Given our interest in the behavioural 
characteristics of banks, along with the substantial changes in the operational environment 
during the reform, focusing on banks that were continuously operating is all the more 
important. If banks merged during the period of observation, we chose to aggregate their 
financial statements and treat them as a single composite bank for the entire period. The data 
set contains 13 years of accounting data for 65 banks (27 public, 20 domestic private and 18 
foreign), for a total of 845 observations. All data were deflated using the GDP deflator using 
1991 as the base year. 
Table 3 presents some general statistics of the data set at the industry level and per ownership 
category. 
Insert Table 3 here 
As can be seen in Table 3, the mean of total cost and of all the 3 outputs is always larger than 
the median, indicating a distribution skewed to the right; this is due to the larger market 
share of public banks revealed also in Table 1.  Indeed the average for public banks is always 
almost twice the industry average, and they always account for the maximum value at 
industry level, whereas the shares of domestic private and foreign banks are remarkably 
lower. The two inputs prices have instead a much smaller variation, and the correlations 
between the variables
7
 are all of the expected sign. 
 
                                                 
7 Since they are not particularly revealing these are not reported in the paper for reasons of space. 
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4.2 Model specification 
To answer the first research question (the effect of regulatory reform on the cost efficiency of 
the Indian banking sector) we follow Battese and Coelli
8
 (1995) and estimate a stochastic 
cost frontier simultaneously with the determinants of cost inefficiency, using a one-step 
Maximum Likelihood estimation. There are several reasons behind the choice of this model. 
First of all a cost frontier, as opposed to an “average” cost function, allows one to separate 
and compare the behaviour of the best practices with the rest of the sample. Secondly, the 
choice of a frontier with inefficiency determinants not only answers one of the key questions 
of the paper (the relationship between ownership and efficiency) but it is also the most 
unrestricted model within which other frontier specifications are embedded. As will be more 
apparent below, if the chosen covariates for inefficiency are not significant the model falls 
back to a truncated-normal frontier specification, which in turn nests the half normal 
specification; if inefficiency is not significant at all then the model falls back to a cost 
function. All these hypotheses can be tested and the results are specified and discussed in 
Section 5.  
In general terms, the stochastic cost frontier model is specified in log-linear form as
9
: 
itititit uvXfVC );(ln          (1) 
and 
ititit Zu '                    (2) 
where VC is total variable cost, X is a set of independent variables (inputs prices, output 
                                                 
8 Fries and Taci (2005) review the advantages of using a one-step estimation of the determinants of inefficiency over the 
alternative two step estimation. See also Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003) for a complete methodology review on 
incorporating exogenous influence on efficiency.  
9 For a complete summary of both the theory and techniques used in frontier production, cost and profit analysis, see 
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2003).  
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levels and other exogenous factors), and β is a vector of technological parameters to 
estimate. Random errors are represented by vit ~iidN(0,
2
v ), whereas cost inefficiency is 
represented by uit, which is non-negative and assumed to be independently but not identically 
distributed, and follows a truncated-normal distribution with constant variance, that is uit 
~N
+(δ’Zit, ζ
2
u). The distribution of vit is assumed to be independent of the Xs as well as of 
uit. 
Equation (2) further specifies the determinants of inefficiency, a set of bank-specific 
explanatory variables Z, with parameters δ to be estimated. The random error component εit 
~N(0,ζ2ε) is truncated at the variable point –δ’Zit to allow for the non-negativity constraint 
on uit, so that εit ≥–δ’Zit. The errors are assumed to be independently but not necessarily 
identically distributed, nor are required to be non-negative.  
The stochastic frontier briefly described in (1) is modelled using a translog functional form, 
(Diewert and Wales, 1987), as: 
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In (3), VC is total variable cost, ym are the three outputs and wn are the two inputs prices 
discussed in Section 4.1. Linear homogeneity in input prices is imposed prior to estimation; 
following standard practice, we normalise each input and output variable by its geometric 
mean, so that the estimated first-order coefficients measure directly the cost elasticity at the 
sample mean. T is a time trend variable, introduced quadratically as a proxy for a non-
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monotonic pattern of the changes in cost technology.  
The interaction between T and the price and outputs variables models non-neutral and scale 
augmenting technology change respectively. Technological biases are more likely to occur in 
the case of multiple inputs - multiple outputs production
10
 (Balk, 2001) and their presence is 
well documented in the literature on the banking industry (see Altunbas et al., 1999 among 
others). This can have significant consequences in the context of a changing regulatory 
environment (Stevenson, 1980; Paul, 1999).  
To isolate and investigate the impact of the shift of policy focus (from 1998 onwards) on the 
efficient cost structure, we specify a bilateral policy-shift dummy R, which takes value 0 for 
1992-1997 and value 1 for 1998-2004. Moreover, following Gollop and Roberts (1983) we 
allow the policy shift dummy to interact with time, input prices and output quantities to 
evaluate the response of the “best practices” in terms of output composition and input mix 
specifically associated with the shift of policy focus rather than with the simple passing of 
time
11
. vit and uit are defined as before. 
Coming to the cost inefficiency model of equation (2) this is fully specified as:    
 
itPFP
FPFPFit
TTRDTRDRD
RDRTRTTDTDDDu
2
1211109
876543210
               (4) 
 
Equation (4) includes 12 explanatory variables to reflect the effect of time, of the change of 
policy focus, of ownership as well as their interactive terms. The introduction of the 
                                                 
10 Fare et al., (1997) state the stringent conditions under which those biases would not exist. 
11 Although the dummy R is related to time, it is possible to identify its effects on cost since it is not a linear function of the 
time trend variable (T) (Kumbhakar and Lozano-Vivas, 2005) 
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interactive terms facilitates the examination of the inter-ownership cost efficiency 
differences and their change over time. FD  and DP are dummy variables set equal to 1 for 
foreign and domestic private banks respectively, and 0 otherwise; public sector banks are 
therefore the reference ownership category. R, T and εit are defined as before.  
To answer the second research question, i.e. the impact of regulatory reform on the dynamics 
of competition, we use a partial adjustment AR(1) model
12
 in line with the POP literature’s 
idea that persistence of profitability (measured as the gap between price and marginal cost) 
becomes less likely with increased competition, whilst controlling for macro and industry 
level external shocks. While the estimated persistence parameter of the widely used AR(1) 
process is explained as a signal of the strength of competition (Geroski, 1990; Glen et al., 
2003), our analysis directs the unspecified structural model of the POP literature to the profit 
maximizing behaviour of banks and thus provides us with a stronger theoretical basis for the 
empirical representation of competitive dynamics.  
We concentrate the analysis on the lending market, implicitly assuming that credit 
intermediation still represents the predominant activity of banks, and assume that banks are 
price-setting profit maximizers. Changes in price reflect banks’ perception of changes in 
competitive conditions in the lending market: an increase in the perceived intensity of 
competition forces banks to adjust the overcharge. Ultimately, if competition were perfect 
price would equal marginal cost, so the ratio would be equal to one. Taking the marginal cost 
as the benchmark price under perfect competition, the adjustment of the overcharge towards 
unity indicates the dynamic evolution from imperfect toward perfect competition. Our partial 
                                                 
12 For a review of the application of the persistence of profitability in banking see Goddard et al. (2004b).  
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adjustment model is given by:  
itTtiittiittiit TDmkmkRmkmkmkmk )ln*(ln)ln(ln)ln(ln )1()1(
*
)1(  (5) 
In (5), itmk  is the overcharge on performing loans at time t, defined as the ratio of their 
imputed price over their marginal cost (as estimated from (3) which therefore logically 
precedes it)
13
, 
)1t(imk is the overcharge at time t-1. mkit* is the overcharge under perfect 
competition, i.e. unity (and therefore zero when taking logs). TDs are time dummies used to 
capture exogenous external industry and macro level variables such as the growth of demand 
for bank loans, competitive pressure on the banking industry as a whole imposed by other 
segments of the financial market, monetary policy and macroeconomic shocks, the opacity 
of the informational environment in the credit market, etc. These variables might cause 
asymmetric changes in costs and in the profit maximizing price and thus need to be 
controlled for. it  is the disturbance term, and it ~iid(0, ζ
2
).  R is the bilateral policy-shift 
dummy, defined as before.  is the adjustment parameter, measuring the speed of adjustment 
towards a value of unity of the overcharge, with 10 . The interaction term between R 
and )mklnmk(ln it
*
it  allows for a change in the speed of adjustment between 1992-1997 
and 1998-2004; again 1)(0 . A significant positive  would imply a faster 
adjustment speed towards perfectly competitive prices (and vice versa) in 1998-2004, when 
the policy focus was changed, therefore indicating stronger competition. Finally, the 
vector T measures the impact of the external macro-level variables on the change of 
overcharge.  
                                                 
13 In our estimation, the overcharge is estimated on performing loans, thereby controlling for the riskiness of banks loan 
portfolios. Since we use the imputed price of performing loans, we are considering the aggregate average interest rate and 
do not consider the impact of non-price loan characteristics, such as different maturity structures, different amounts, etc., on 
the interest rate charged on loans. However, as we are interested in the evolution of the ratio of price over marginal cost, 
rather than in the absolute level of price, this omission should not have a significant impact on our findings. A similar 
approach was followed by Pinho (2000). 
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Rearranging equation (5), we get: 
itTtiptiit TDmkRmkmk )1()1( lnlnln                                                 (6) 
where α = 1-β and γp = -δ. In (6) the value of α measures the persistence of 1itmk  into itmk . 
A significantly negative value for γp , corresponding to a significantly positive δ, would 
suggest a reduction in the persistence of the overcharge in the period 1998-2004 compared to 
1992-1997 (and viceversa), which in turn could indicate an increase in the intensity of 
competition.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 The Stochastic frontier model 
The simultaneous ML estimation of equations (3) and (4) was performed using the 
programme FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli, 1996). To check the model robustness, a series of 
hypotheses related to the nature of the frontier model
14
 and to the consistency of the cost 
function with its theoretical properties
15
 was tested on the first set of results by means of 
Likelihood-ratio (LR) tests.  The null hypothesis was rejected at a 1% level of significance in 
all cases except for the joint significance of the interaction between the policy-shift dummy 
and the other variables. Moreover, the presence of these interactive terms appeared to be 
inconsistent with the regularity conditions of the function with respect to the input prices at 
the sample mean. We therefore decided to withdraw these variables and re-estimate 
                                                 
14 The following hypotheses were tested: the adequacy of a more restrictive Cobb-Douglas functional form; the existence of 
technological change; the existence of non-neutral technological change; whether technology is homothetic; the significance 
of a policy-shift effect; the significance of a policy-shift bias towards one particular input or output; the significance of 
inefficiency; the stochastic nature of inefficiency; the overall significance of the inefficiency model. 
15 Lack of consistency would lead to draw biased policy implications, as suggested by Salvanes and Tjotta (1998). The 
hypotheses tested include a non-negative marginal cost and the monotonicity and concavity in input prices. Homogeneity 
with respect to input prices is imposed prior to estimation.  
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equations (3) and (4). The new estimations passed all the tests and the results are reported in 
Table 4, which shows that 19 out of the 22 parameters of the cost frontier and 11 out of the 
13 parameters of the cost inefficiency model are significant at the 10% level
16
.  
<Insert Table 4> 
Looking at Table 4, the results on the quadratic time trend indicate technological regress 
until 1996, with costs increasing until then and decreasing thereafter. This non-monotonic 
pattern could reflect the initial difficulties faced by banks to adjust the high and rigid cost 
structure inherited from the pre-reform period to the new operating environment. This 
improvement is temporarily interrupted in 1998 by the change in policy focus from fostering 
competition to emphasising supervision, as the significantly positive coefficient of the 
dummy variable R indicates an upward shift of the cost frontier. However this comes as a 
one-off additional regulatory cost and does not further affect the change in banks output 
composition or their input mix, since the policy-shift bias indicators were found jointly 
insignificant. Recalling the consultative and gradual approach of the Indian reforms, this 
may reflect the groundwork that banks made for the forthcoming policy change, with 
especially the best practices (whose behaviour is captured by the efficient frontier) being 
forward-looking and thus preparing well in advance for regulatory changes. Looking more 
closely at the technological changes, total cost elasticity increases from a value of 0.984 in 
1992 to one of 0.996 in 2004, indicating that overall banks are enjoying very mild, though 
statistically non significant, economies of scale that get exhausted with the passing of time. 
The overall minimum efficient production scale decreases over time (i.e. 1 + 2 + 3 >0) but 
                                                 
16 Lower levels of significance on the translog are not uncommon due to the presence of the quadratic and interactive terms. 
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this is attributable only to the production of other earning assets, as their coefficient of time 
variation, 2 , is the only positive one. This could seem to contradict the increase in their 
holdings on banks balance sheets, although the effect is quantitatively very small (0.016%).  
It is therefore possible that banks incentives to increase the proportion of other earning assets 
may be attributable to a wider cost-benefit analysis of their portfolio composition in the 
changing regulatory environment, in particular with the implementation of prudential norms.   
With regards to the possible non-neutral technology change, the negative and significant 
parameter suggests that the estimated efficient cost share of loanable funds relative to 
other non-interest operating cost decreases over time, possibly as a consequence of banks’ 
expectations of an increase in their price induced by increased competition. The 
complementary increase in the share of non-interest operating costs may also reflect the 
increasing effort of banks to clean up their balance sheet, in line with the implementation of 
prudential norms.  
Turning to the characteristics of inefficiency, this is overall significant and shows a general 
non-monotonic pattern over time. Overall the main efficiency gains take place in the period 
1992-1997: this goes hand-in-hand with deregulation as well as with the initial worsening of 
the frontier explained before. In 1998-2004 the general trend in efficiency is instead 
negative, so that overall the industry average decreases from 95.2% in 1992-1997 to 83.4% 
in 1998-2004. This could be explained both by the change in policy focus per se as well as 
by the fact that this comes as a one-off cost to the industry and does not hinder the 
technological improvements initiated under deregulation. This may therefore explain why, on 
average, banks find it more difficult to perform efficiently. Finally this negative trend is part 
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of a more general concave pattern, indicating that the worsening in performance slows down 
over time. What is interesting is that the speed and direction of these adjustments vary across 
ownership types, as shown in Figure 1. At the beginning of the sample period foreign banks 
have a significantly higher cost efficiency than public banks (δ1<0), presumably due to their 
relatively stronger operating background. This advantage however decreases over time 
(δ3>0): by the time the policy focus changes, public banks have increased their efficiency 
(δ6<0), whereas foreign banks have worsened their position (δ8 >0). The implementation of 
tighter prudential norms sees foreign banks initially better equipped to adapt than public 
banks (δ10<0 and δ7>0), with the latter worsening their position at a slightly faster rate. The 
general efficiency trend during this time is however overall negative for both ownerships: by 
2004 public banks average efficiency has decreased from 96.8% to 75.8%, and foreign 
banks’ from 90.9% to 66.7%. Domestic private banks have a much lower cost efficiency than 
public banks for most of the period 1992-1997 (δ2>0). This may be due to their particular 
operational situation, since they are the smaller domestic banks that remained privately 
owned following two rounds of nationalisation17. Their operating conditions were initially 
relatively weak and they presumably feared of being nationalised if they became well-
established (Bhattacharya et al., 1997). They do display an improvement in efficiency during 
the period 1992-1997 (δ4<0), but they do not seem to achieve significant progress (as 
indicated by the negative but not significant value of δ9) and they also adapt worse than 
public banks to the new policy measures (δ11>0) so that in 2004 they are the least efficient 
group, with an average of 65.5%. 
                                                 
17 The Indian government nationalised 14 large domestic private banks in 1969 and another 6 banks in 1980. In 1980, banks 
nationalisation was carried out according to a strict cut-off rule, whereby the government took control of those banks whose 
aggregate (all-India) deposits were greater than Rs. 2 billion.  
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This uneven impact of the shift of policy focus on the time pattern of efficiency among 
different ownerships probably stems from their different customer base. As pointed out by 
Berger et al. (2006), the customer base of foreign banks is characterised by large, well 
established and credit-worthy firms; the main customers of domestic private banks are 
informationally opaque small firms (SMEs) whilst the majority of customers of public banks 
are state-owned firms. The finding that foreign banks adapt better to the post-1997 policy 
measures may be attributed to the higher quality of their customer base, as well as to their 
operational structure and international standards. Similarly, the finding that domestic private 
banks suffered the most post-1997 could be related to their customer base, since tighter 
prudential norms presumably have a negative impact on the provision of financial services to 
SMEs. This is consistent with the empirical evidence on the association between the 
reduction in supervisory toughness and the increase in SMEs lending during the period 1993-
98 in the U.S (Berger et al., 2001). To summarise, our results indicate the existence of an 
ownership effect on the level and the pattern of cost efficiency, and also that the external 
regulatory environment impacts on it. Particularly, our model identifies two rounds of inter-
ownership reshuffle in terms of cost inefficiency. The first round (during the period 1992-
1997) shows the progressive adjustment and the opportunity seeking behaviour of banks in 
response to the increasing functional autonomy and operational freedom. The second round 
(1998-2004) emphasises the different degrees of pressure perceived by different ownerships 
under tighter prudential norms.  
 
5.2 The dynamics of competition in the lending market 
As explained in Section 4.1, the impact of regulatory changes on the dynamics of 
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competition in the lending market is analysed via the examination of the persistence of the 
overcharge, as modelled by equation (6). The assumption behind our partial adjustment 
model is that the pricing behaviour of banks mirrors their perception of the intensity of 
competition in the market place, so that an increase in the perceived intensity of competition 
will compel them to set the price closer to their marginal cost at a faster speed, therefore 
reducing the persistence of the overcharge. Equation (6) is estimated by pooled OLS, and the 
results are showed in Table 5. 
<Insert Table 5 here> 
The estimated coefficient on the one-period lag of the overcharge is α for 1992-1997 and 
α+γp for 1998-2004. Both α and γp are statistically significant, at the 1% and 7% levels 
respectively. The significantly negative γp, the coefficient of the interaction between R and 
the lag of the overcharge on loans, indicates faster adjustment speed after 1997 and therefore 
suggests that competitive market forces become stronger in the latter stages of the reform. 
Our estimated persistence parameters are quite high (0.87 for 1992-1997, and 0.76 for the 
period of 1998-2004) compared with those obtained in other studies
18
 probably because by 
looking specifically at the convergence of price towards marginal cost we set a higher 
benchmark on the convergence process.  
To summarise the evidence from both models, the picture they reveal is the following. 
Deregulation seems to starts a process of improvement in banks performance and increases 
competition on the market. This process needs time to build up, and initial adjustment costs 
are followed by technological progress after 1996, with banks progressively changing their 
                                                 
18 For example Goddard et al., (2004b) estimate a persistence of profitability parameter of 0.439 in a study on banks in the 
six largest European countries. 
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inputs mix and output composition. The change in policy focus in 1998 comes as a one-off 
cost to the sector, for competition keeps building pace even in the re-regulation period and 
technological improvements are not hampered by the tightening of prudential norms.  
Inefficiency is significant and differences in ownership show up mainly as differences in the 
speed of adjustment. Consistently with the changes in the frontier, efficiency improves 
mainly in the first period and, on average, it decreases afterwards. Public banks start off as 
less efficient than foreign banks but catch up fairly quickly. Even though by 1998 they have 
worsened their position foreign banks react more quickly to the new changes in the 
regulatory environment.  
6. Conclusions  
Using a balanced panel dataset covering continuously operating public sector, domestic 
private and foreign banks throughout the period 1992-2004, we examined the impact of a 
deregulation – prudential re-regulation framework on the characteristics of the competitive 
behaviour, cost structure and on the ownership-cost efficiency relationship of Indian 
commercial banks. Our results indicate that Indian commercial banks have been changing 
both their input mix and output composition to accommodate the changes in the regulatory 
environment. Pure cost technology worsens at the initial stages of the reform, possibly due to 
the rigid cost structure inherited from the pre-reform period, but improves after 1996 as 
market participants adjust and take advantage of the new opportunities. Except for the 
upward shift of the cost frontier after 1997, there is no significant structural break in the 
efficient cost function associated with the change of policy focus, a signal that the best 
practices among Indian commercial banks accomplished the majority of the adjustments to 
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their production process before the change in policy measures.  Our results also suggest that 
the ownership-cost efficiency relationship is affected by the reforms. The analysis of the 
dynamics of competition in the lending market suggests stronger competitive market forces 
in 1998-2004, despite tighter prudential norms. These results are consistent with the 
appearance of pure cost technology progress during the same period. Therefore, prudential 
re-regulation may not necessarily come at the cost of competition.  
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Table 1: Summary of the Indian banking industry (1992 – 2004) 
 
Public 
Domestic 
private 
Foreign Total Banking Sector 
 N. of 
banks 
Mkt 
Share 
 
N. of 
banks 
Mkt 
Share 
 
N. of 
banks 
Mkt 
Share 
N.of 
banks  
 
HHI CR5 2  
1992 28 0.885 25 0.042 24 0.072 77 0.102 0.516 0.00116 
1995 27 0.861 32 0.064 27 0.073 86 0.079 0.463 0.00078 
1998 27 0.743 34 0.140 42 0.116 103 0.072 0.446 0.00060 
2000 27 0.712 32 0.177 42 0.110 101 0.072 0.445 0.00061 
2004 27 0.745 30 0.185 33 0.069 90 0.064 0.415 0.00059 
Note: Market Share, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) and Five-firm Concentration Ratio (CR5) are 
calculated relative to total assets. 
2
 measures the market shares’ variance about the mean, i.e 1/n.  
Data source: Reserve Bank of India, author’s calculation 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of selected banking indicators 
  1992 1995 1998 2002 2004 
(1) Implicit deposit rate 
a
 0.065 0.056 0.076 0.074 0.048 
(2) Implicit credit rate 
b
 0.155 0.11 0.136 0.108 0.095 
(3) Loanable fund price 
c
 0.080 0.063 0.081 0.075 0.052 
Spread A = (2)-(1) 0.093 0.053 0.06 0.034 0.047 
Spread B = (2)-(3) 0.075 0.047 0.055 0.033 0.043 
Total loans/total earning assets 
d
 
0.603 0.588 0.578 0.541 0.510 
Government security/total investment
 e
 
0.629 0.664 0.664 0.726 0.793 
SRL 
f
 0.339 0.349 0.323 0.373 0.416 
Fee-based income/ total income 
g
 
0.134 0.138 0.154 0.196 0.237 
Notes
: a 
implicit deposit rate = interest paid on deposits/ total deposits 
b 
implicit credit rate = interest income received on loans/total loans. 
c
 loanable fund price = total interest rate payment/total deposits and money market borrowing.  
d 
total earning assets = total loans and total investment.  
e 
total investment = government securities, other approved securities, shares, debentures and bonds, 
subsidiaries and joint ventures and other investment outside India.  
f
 SRL = Statutory Liquidity Ratio. 
g
 total income = fee-based income and total interest income.   
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Table 3: Data descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Min Max Stdev 
Observed total 
operating cost 
(VC) 
Industry 
average 
6792.97 
 
2645.63 12.06 137723.5 13991.57 
Public 
banks 
13334.11 
 
8361.23 1595.03 137723.5 19068.15 
Domestic 
private 
2515.55 
 
961.77 12.06 48812.32 6392.24 
Foreign 
banks 
1733.94 
 
502.99 66.22 14875.62 2636.76 
Performing 
loans (Q1) 
Industry 
average 
31965.98 
 
12614.72 9.50 667624 65969.72 
Public 
banks 
60830.81 
 
33008.23 7235.36 667624 87848.62 
Domestic 
private 
14444.2 
 
4616.51 81.05 285287.2 40729.11 
Foreign 
banks 
8137.37 
 
2405.18 9.50 67436.93 12640.38 
Other earning 
assets (Q2) 
Industry 
average 
31112.19 
 
10447.18 24.66 1028343 77491.06 
Public 
banks 
62893.92 
 
37634.76 4804.94 1028343 110142.9 
Domestic 
private 
10216.4 
 
3758.28 24.66 237657.5 26783.96 
Foreign 
banks 
6657.15 
 
1681.06 90.62 73062.98 11018.36 
Fee-based 
income (Q3) 
Industry 
average 
1236.71 
 
468.68 0.01 33331.54 2734.48 
Public 
banks 
2198.94 
 
1163.38 225.95 33331.54 3663.34 
Domestic 
private 
589.53 
 
167.90 0.48 15042.3 1853.33 
Foreign 
banks 
512.43 
 
118.61 0.01 3963.65 848.22 
Loanable fund 
price (W1) 
Industry 
average 
0.079 0.074 0.017 1.07 0.41 
Public 
banks 
0.072 
 
0.073 0.038 0.103 0.010 
Domestic 
private 
0.074 
 
0.074 0.017 0.121 0.014 
Foreign 
banks 
0.09 
 
0.08 0.036 1.07 0.074 
Non-operating 
cost price 
(W2) 
Industry 
average 
0.026 
 
0.026 0.0044 
 
0.33 
 
0.014 
Public 
banks 
0.028 0.027 0.017 0.044 0.0047 
Domestic 
private 
0.025 0.025 0.006 0.047 0.006 
Foreign 
banks 
0.024 
 
0.021 0.0044 0.33 0.024 
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Table 4: ML estimates of the translog cost frontier [equations (3) and (4)] 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard error 
Cost Function     
Intercept β0 11.256 0.022** 
lny1 α1 0.539 0.027** 
lny2 α2 0.442 0.026** 
lny3 α3 0.002 0.013 
lnw1 β1 0.886 0.035** 
lny1*lny1 α11 0.070 0.012** 
lny1*lny2 α12 -0.078 0.017** 
lny1*lny3 α13 0.022 0.005** 
lny2*lny2 α22 0.108 0.020** 
lny2*lny3 α23 -0.025 0.004** 
lny3*lny3 α33 -0.002 0.002 
lnw1*lnw1 β11 -0.047 0.025* 
lnw1*lny1 δ11 -0.074 0.017** 
lnw1*lny2 δ12 0.074 0.017** 
lnw1*lny3 δ13 -0.016 0.012 
T θ 0.074 0.008** 
T*T λ -0.009 0.001** 
lny1*T θ1 -0.012 0.003** 
lny2*T θ2 0.016 0.003** 
lny3*T θ3 -0.003 0.001** 
lnw1*T δ1 -0.035 0.004** 
R αr 0.069 0.027** 
Inefficiency model    
Intercept δ0 -0.937 0.299** 
Df δ1 -0.779 0.410** 
Dp δ2 1.172 0.296** 
TDf δ3 0.256 0.094** 
TDp δ4 -0.313 0.110** 
T δ5 0.095 0.086 
R δ6 -1.406 0.486** 
RT δ7 0.213 0.095** 
RDf δ8 1.658 0.470** 
RDp δ9 -0.398 0.312 
RTDf δ10 -0.311 0.095** 
RTDp δ11 0.265 0.107** 
T*T δ12 -0.008 0.004** 
ζ2  0.037 0.003 
γ  0.785 0.036** 
Log likelihood function  578.22  
Note: 
222
vu ，
22 /u . *, **, significant at 10% and 5% respectively.  
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Table 5: Competition Dynamics in the Lending Market [equation (6)] 
 .8709*** 
(.0455) 
γp -.0921* 
(.0510) 
1993  
-0.007 
(.0313) 
1994  
.0441** 
(.0217) 
1995  
-.0130 
(.0214) 
1996  
.1059*** 
(.0149) 
1997  
.1175*** 
(.0179) 
1998  
-.0606*** 
(.0223) 
1999  
 .0108 
(.0144) 
2000  
.0263* 
(.0138) 
2001  
.0665*** 
(.0202) 
2002  
.0724*** 
(.0164) 
2003  
.1089*** 
(.0229) 
2004  
.0751*** 
(.0277) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.84 
Root MSE 0.15 
Pro>F(14, 64) 0.00 
Note: the figures in bracket are standard errors that are asymptotically robust to both heteroskedasticity and 
serial correlation. *, **, ***, indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Figure 1: Average efficiency levels per ownership category  
 
 
 
